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I. INTRODUCTION
STATE MEDICAL LICENSURE boards perform the important
functions of investigating allegations that physicians are incom-
petent or have behaved unprofessionally and of taking disciplinary
action where such allegations are substantiated. Given the impor-
tance of these tasks, it is surprising that very little is known about
how well boards are able to perform them. Most discussion about
the effectiveness of medical boards has been based on counts of dis-
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ciplinary actions (e.g., number of revocations, suspensions and pro-
bations imposed per one thousand physicians), which do not give us
a full picture of board activity. Very little is known about who com-
plains to medical boards, how allegations of incompetence or un-
professional conduct are investigated, and how boards react once a
problem has been confirmed.
This article begins to examine this hitherto unexplored process.
It concentrates on two main issues. First, it attempts to understand
more about those who complain to boards. Treating persons who
complain as an example of an aggrieved population, we present a
profile of complainants and discuss what might have motivated
them to complain and what the objectives of their complaints might
be. We also consider the extent to which those who complain are a
distinct population, especially focusing on whether or not there is
an overlap between complainants and claimants, i.e., those persons
who sue for medical malpractice. Second, this article explores the
response of one state medical licensure board to public complaints.
It examines the process of complaint investigation and the types of
action taken by boards against physicians as a result of complaints.
Data concerning these processes are considered in the context of the
larger question of what functions licensure boards can be expected
to perform with respect to identification and disciplining of incom-
petent physicians.
II. THE FUNCTION OF THE STATE MEDICAL BOARD.
Each state in the United States has a medical licensure board
responsible for controlling entry into the medical profession by
means of licensure and for disciplining physicians who are incompe-
tent or who engage in "unprofessional" conduct. These boards vary
considerably in their approach to these tasks and in the extent to
which their activities are facilitated by state legislation. They all,
however, have a variety of disciplinary powers including, most com-
monly, the power to revoke or suspend licenses and to place physi-
cians on probation.'
State boards initiate investigations of physicians primarily on
the basis of information received from two main categories of
sources.' First, there are public complaints: letters or phone calls
1. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE
OF EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND MEDICAL DISCIPLINE:
A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW 12 (1990) (hereinafter OIG, STATE BY STATE REVIEW).
2. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS,
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alleging mismanaged care or inappropriate behavior received from
patients, their relatives or friends, or professionals involved immedi-
ately in their care. Second, there are reports and referrals from
other individuals or entities, including referrals from boards within
the state that license other professionals or institutions or from the
medical licensure boards of other states; reports of disciplinary ac-
tions taken by hospitals, of malpractice payments by insurers, of
criminal convictions by the courts, and of sanctions imposed at the
instance of Medicare Peer Review Organizations; and reports of
questionable conduct of licensees submitted by physicians, pharma-
cists, or other professionals. Under the recently adopted federal
Health Care Quality Improvement Act3 and the laws of many
states, certain referrals or reports are mandatory.
In recent years, the number of reports, referrals or complaints
received by medical licensure boards have been increasing.4 In Cal-
ifornia, for example, the number of complaints against physicians
almost doubled in eight years, from around 4,000 complaints a year
in 1983 to over 7,000 in 1990.1 In New York, the number of com-
plaints increased from 1699 in 1985 to over 5000 in 1989.6 The
cause of this increase is not immediately obvious. While one expla-
nation is that the quality of care and services has declined, equally
plausible explanations are that societal norms inhibiting com-
plaining behavior have decreased, or that changes in operation of
the boards have facilitated complaining. Whatever the explana-
tion, the phenomena of public complaints is worthy of
consideration.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BOARD SELECTED
FOR STUDY
The study described herein reviewed complaints closed by the
Ohio State Medical Board during 1990. It analyzed a random sam-
ple of case files including both complaints, referrals, and reports
made to the Board together with the records of the Board's investi-
gations and responses to those complaints, reports and referrals.
OFFICE OF EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND MEDICAL DIs-
CIPLINE 3-6 (1990) (hereinafter OIG, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131-1137 (West Supp. 1992).
4. OIG, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, supra note 2, at 5.
5. KENNETH J. WAGSTAFF, CALIFORNIA'S CENTRAL COMPLAINTS AND INVESTIGA-
TIONS UNIT, FED. BULL., Nov. 1991, at 331 (1991). Federation Bulletin. In this context
complaint is used to refer generically to what otherwise are referred to in this article as com-
plaints, reports and referrals.
6. OIG, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, supra note 2, at 5.
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The Ohio State Medical Board licenses medical doctors, osteo-
paths, podiatrists, physicians assistants and massage therapists. In
1990 the Board had 22,706 physicians under its jurisdiction, rank-
ing it seventh among State Boards in the number of licensees.7 The
Board has twelve members, including nine physicians and three
members appointed to represent consumer interests. In 1989 the
Ohio Board had twelve full-time investigators. Only the California
licensure board had more.' As is true with other state medical li-
censure boards, the number of complaints and reports and referrals
received by the Ohio Board has been increasing. Table 1 show the
number and source of complaints, reports, and referrals made to the
Board during the year studied here and the two preceding years.
During 1990 the Ohio Board imposed 91 serious disciplinary ac-
TABLE 1
Table to show the number and source of complaints and referrals made
to the Ohio State Medical Board 1988-1990
Source of Complaint or Referral 1988 1989 1990
Public complaints 36% 36% 38%
Medical Board/Staff 26% 24% 23%
Mandatory reports 8% <1% 8%
Anonymous 5% 3% 6%
Other Boards/Agencies 5% 3% 2%
Drug wholesalers 4% <1%
Auditor 4% 12% 8%
Physicians 4% 8% 8%
Peer Review Organizations - - 2%
Pharmacists 3% <1% 1%
Professional associations 2% 2% 1%
Other (media, police, etc) 2% 7% 1%
Insurance companies <1% <1% <1%
Hospitals <1% 1% <1%
Total Received 1100 1152 1654
tions (license revocations, suspensions and probations) ranking it
eleventh among State Boards in number of formal actions taken.9
Though it would perhaps have been preferable to conduct a
comparative study of several medical licensure Boards, problems of
access to confidential data make such a study difficult. Access to
7. INGRID VANTUINEN & SIDNEY WOLFE, STATE MEDICAL LICENSING BOARD SERI-
OUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS IN 1990 27 (1991).
8. OIG, STATE BY STATE REVIEW, supra note 1, at 11.
9. VANTUINEN AND WOLFE, supra note 7, at Table 2.
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the Ohio Board complaint files was only possible because one of the
investigators was a member of the Board, and thus had access to the
Board files.10 As the Ohio Board is in many respects typical of large
medical board, however," the examination of its complaints and
complaint processing, presented herein, is a useful starting point for
considering broader questions of complainant and board behavior.
IV. METHODOLOGY
This study analyzed cases closed during 1990 by the Ohio Board
that were generated by complaints, reports, and referrals. We ran-
domly selected 200 closed cases initiated by public complaints and
200 closed cases initiated by referrals and reports for analysis.
These amounted to 48.5% of the cases closed during 1990 initiated
by public complaints and 34.6% of the closed cases generated by
other reports and referrals.
Analysis of the complaints drew on research instruments devel-
oped by Lloyd-Bostock and Mulcahy at the Centre for Socio-Legal
Studies of Oxford University as part of an ongoing study of the
socio-legal dynamics of complaining behavior in the British Na-
tional Health Service. 2 The schedule developed by these research-
ers was shortened and modified for use in an American setting. In
order to establish its content validity, drafts were reviewed by sev-
eral experts familiar with consumer complaints and pretested on a
pilot sample.
Because of the confidentiality restrictions noted above, it was
not possible to have Board case files reviewed by researchers other
than the principal investigator, a Board member and author. Intra-
rater reliability was established for survey items used for analysis,
however, by having the principal investigator recode a 15% random
sample of coded surveys following a six-month lag, minimizing
memory effects. An 80% decision rule on agreement was used for
determining intra-rater reliability. Of the 68 items on the survey, 52
(76%) passed the 80% test. Of the 18 that did not, additional relia-
bility validation was done using the Kappa statistic, which controls
for the marginal distribution of the response set. Items with Kap-
10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(C)(1) (Baldwin 1992) (rendering complaints
and other information uncovered through a complaint investigation strictly confidential).
11. See R. John Kinkel & Norma C. Josef, Disciplining Doctor" How Medical Boards
are Dealing with Problem Physicians in the Midwest, 9 REs. IN THE Soc. OF HEALTH CARE
207 (1991); OIG, STATE BY STATE REVIEW, supra note 1 (generally showing that the char-
acteristics of the Ohio Board are similar to those of other medical boards).
12. This study is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.
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pas lower than .67 were deleted from the analysis and deemed unre-
liable. In total, 7 of the 18 items in question generated unreliable
results using this test, and were not used in the analysis.
It can be seen from Table 1, that in 1990 the Board received
1654 complaints, 38% of which originated with the public. Because
of our particular interest in expression of grievance and in the dy-
namics of disputing behaviour, we concentrated on analyzing public
complaints. In addition some analysis was done of another 200 re-
ferrals and comparisons are made between the two when appropri-
ate. Table 2 shows the breakdown of sources of referrals and
reports in the sample studied.
V. WHO COMPLAINS?
It is clear from recent research that few people who have a
grievance voice it by complaining or instituting a legal claim.13
Most people choose to "lump" their grievance (i.e., put up with it or
ignore it) or to avoid expressing it by "exiting" (abandoning or lim-
iting) the troublesome relationship.14 In the medical context there
is evidence that the vast majority of patients do not sue for negli-
gently caused injuries.15 Most recently, the Harvard Medical Prac-
tice Study has demonstrated that the gap between negligent injuries
and claims is substantial. That study concluded that less than one
out of twenty-four injuries resulting from medical treatment, and
one in nine negligently caused injuries, results in litigation or re-
quest for payment.16 Studies of complaining and claiming beha-
viour are, therefore, studies of atypical behavior.
Our study concentrated on a variety of characteristics of persons
who complained to the State Board. We collected data on whether
complainants were also patients, the sex and age of complainants,
what complainants said they wanted to achieve by complaining and
13. See DONALD HARRIS ET AL., COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND
INJURY 46 (1984) (finding that only 14% of all accident victims consulted an attorney).
14. See, e.g., William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organizations on Dispute
Processing, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 63, 70, 81 (1974) (explaining outcome of lumping and
avoidance behavior); Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd, Jr., Introduction: The Disputing Process,
in THE DISPUTING PROCESS 9 (Laura Nader & Harry F. Todd Jr. eds., 1978) (pointing to
economic and social reasons for lumping and avoidance).
15. See, eg., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 20-25 (1985) (detailing results of CMA study); Patricia M. Danzon,
Medical Malpractice Liability, in LIABILITY PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 102-05 (Robert E.
Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988) (analyzing factors that may affect claim frequency).
16. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW
YORK 7-28 (1990).
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whether or not complainants displayed any of the characteristics of
those persons who file malpractice suits.
TABLE 2
Table to show sources of reports and referrals analyzed
Source of Referral Number of Cases
License applications' - problems identified by
OMB Staff 33
Other state medical board action 32
Malpractice insurer report 26
Report by another licensee 18
Ohio Medical Board Staff 15
Police or law enforcement 13
Continuing education audit problems identified by
OMB staff 9
Pharmacist 8
Medicare Pro 7
Medical society 5
Anonymous 3
Report of criminal conviction 2
Hospital 1
Other 28
Total 200
A. Are All Complainants Patients?
Complainants are not limited to those who have received or are
receiving care. Indeed, some research suggests that relatives are
likely to rate care more negatively than patients rate it.17 Our study
showed that relatives and friends of patients play an active role in
voicing concerns to the Medical Board. In our sample of 200 public
complaints, 112 (56%) were received from patients and 81 (40.5%)
from non-patient complainants on behalf of a patient.18 In addi-
tion, 17 (18.5%) patients who had complained said in their letter to
the Board that they had been advised to complain by others. Identi-
17. See, eg., Ann H. Walker, & Joseph D. Restuccia, Obtaining Information on Patient
Satisfaction With Hospital Care Mail Versus Telephone, 19 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 291, 300
(1984); STEPHEN STASSER & SHARON SCWEIKKART, WHO IS MORE SATISFIED WITH
MEDICAL CARE? PATIENTS, FAMILY MEMBERS & FRIENDS 2 (The Ohio State University
College of Medicine, Division of Hospital and Health Services Administration Working Pa-
per #94-5631, 1992).
18. An additional seven public complaints (five of which were anonymous) were not
specific to the care of any particular patient but were rather about issues that touched the
patient population in a more general sense.
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fled sources of this advice included physicians, nurses, medical soci-
eties, lawyers and police. Relatives were mentioned in just one case.
The relationship of non-patient complainants to patients is illus-
trated in Table 3. It can be seen from this that children and parents
of a patient were most likely to complain on their behalf.
TABLE 3
Table to show the relationship of non-patient complaints to the patient on
whose behalf they complained
Non-Patient Complainant Number of Cases
Parent
Mother 14
Father 5
Both Father and Mother 1
Total Parent 20
Child
Daughter 20
Son 2
Both Son and Daughter 1
Total Child 23
Other non-relative 15
Other relative 6
Spouse 19
Total 81
(Two complaints were initiated by complainants from more than one
category.)
These figures prompt further questions as to why non-patients
complain on behalf of patients in instances where the patient does
not complain. This was not always obvious from examination of
letters of complaint although there were some indications of why
patients had not complained for themselves. In 11 cases the patient
was dead and in a further 22 cases the patient was a minor. 19 In 16
of the cases involving a patient over 65 the complaint was made by
a person other than the patient, including 9 complaints filed by their
children.
19. In ten of the 22 cases the child was aged between two and 11 years of age, four were
teenagers, one was a baby and in a further seven cases it was not possible to determine the
exact age of the minor. Overall very little data was available from the complaints as to the
exact age of complainants.
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B. Networks of Complaints
The data also suggest that the act of complaining to the State
Medical Board should not be seen in isolation. We looked for indi-
cations that the complainant had made a complaint to another per-
son or agency at the same time as making a complaint to the Board.
In 21 (10.5%) of cases the complainant had either sent a copy of the
complaint made to the Board to another agency or had sent the
Board a copy of a complaint made to another person or agency.
Moreover in a further 99 (40.5%) of cases, there were indications
that the complainant had already complained elsewhere before
complaining to the Board. Of the 120 cases where another person
or agency was contacted, the complainant had contacted a medical
society in 32 cases; a hospital in 19; another licensee in 15; other
state agencies such as another licensing or the Attorney General in
12; and Medicare or insurance companies in 11.
These data have implications for understanding the satisfaction
of complainants with the various channels through which com-
plaints can be expressed, since a complainant's assessment of one
avenue may well be dependent on overall satisfaction with all ave-
nues used. Moreover, it is also clear that there may be a substantial
duplication of effort by the various entities that receive complaints,
and that a more efficient use of resources might call for a more inte-
grated approach to investigations.
C. Is One Sex More Likely To Complain Than The Other?
Research into patient dissatisfaction has suggested that females
are somewhat more likely to be satisfied with health care than
males.20 In this context a remarkable finding of the study was that
women complained to the Board far more often than men. It would
seem then that although women are less likely to be unhappy with
care, women who are dissatisfied are much more likely to complain
than their male counterparts. Overall 129 (71%) of gender identifi-
able complainants were women. Of the 72 non-patient complain-
ants where gender was identifiable, 49 (68%) were women.2 Of the
110 patients complaints where gender could be determined, 80
(73%) of the complainants were women.
The fact that more complaints are from women than men may
be partially explained by the fact that women have more contacts
20. See, eg., Lea Aharony & Stephen Strasser, Patient Satisfaction: What We Know
About and What We Still Need to Explore, 50 MED. CARE REV., Spring 1992, at 49, 59.
21. These data exclude five joint complaints made by both a male and a female.
HEALTH MATRIX
TABLE 4
Table to show frequency and percentages of gender of patient
complainants (N= 110 where gender identifiable) and of non-patient
complainants (N= 72 where gender identifiable)
Gender of Patient Complainants Frequency Percent
Male 30 16.5%
Female 80 44%
Gender of Non-Patient Complainants
Male 23 12.7%
Female 49 27%
Total 182 100%
(This table excludes five joint complaints initiated by both a male and a
female.)
with physicians than men. In 1990 women in the United States had
6.1 contacts with physicians annually compared with 4.7 for men,
30% more.22 The disproportionate number of women among non-
patient complainants is also no doubt attributable in part to the
care-giving role that women tend to play in American families. The
fact that 91% of child complainants were daughters and 73.7% of
parent complainants were mothers illustrates this tendency.
Nevertheless, the problem remains that comparing complain-
ants to the patient or caregiving population as a whole assumes that
complainants are evenly distributed among patients or caregivers.23
A more relevant population with which to compare complainants is
that of the dissatisfied or disputing population, where women seem
underrepresented.24 Thus, the disproportionate number of women
among the complaining population deserves further study.
VI. WHAT DO COMPLAINANTS COMPLAIN ABOUT?
One of the most interesting aspects of examining the com-
plaining process is analysis of the subject matter of complaints.
Analysis of allegations provides an important indication of which
22. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED
STATES 219 (1991) (indicating in Table 76, 6.1 physician contacts per year for women com-
pared with 4.7 for men for 1989) (hereinafter HHS, HEALTH UNITED STATES).
23. See Linda Mulcahy & Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Complaining - What's the Use?, in
QUALITY AND REGULATION IN HEALTH CARE 51, 60-65 (Robert Dingwall & Paul Fenn
eds. 1992).
24. See Ahrony & Strasser, supra note 20 (reviewing the available literature on patient
satisfaction).
[Vol. 3:309
1993] CONSUMERS, COMPLAINT, AND PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE 319
types of medical procedures or behaviour are most likely to form
the basis of a complaint to the state medical board.
Any one complaint may include several allegations of various
types, and the research framework used had to allow for this. We
developed a detailed system for the study which classified allega-
tions according to eighty-nine categories, though, in the end, these
categories were reaggregated into broader classifications for pur-
poses of analysis. Table 5 presents the details of all allegations
made about licensees.
It can be seen from this table that the range of complaints was
extremely wide and varied. It is also evident that while a substan-
tial proportion of complaints raised allegations related to clinical
care, a significant number alleged problems unrelated to clinical
care, such as behavior (58) and billing problems (46).
A. Who Was Complained About?
Most of the complaints (189) related to professionals licensed by
the Board.2" Of these 162 were directed at medical doctors, 23 at
osteopaths, 2 at podiatrists and 2 at massage therapists. It was most
common for complaints to be made against just one practitioner
(169). Where more than one was named, the complaint tended to
be directed at a partnership or group practice as a whole. Practi-
tioners cited in complaints were most likely to be practicing pri-
mary care (including pediatrics) (87) followed by surgery (28);
psychiatry (15); Obstetrics and gynecology (13) and emergency
medicine (13). By contrast, a 1981 General Accounting Office
study of malpractice claims, found that 12% of claims were against
obstetricians and gynecologists, 34% against surgeons, and only
23% against primary care physicians and 4.6% against emergency
medicine specialists. 26
As termination of the physician/patient relationship has been
shown to be significantly related to the propensity to complain, we
looked at whether or not patients whose care was complained of
were still being treated by the professional complained of at the time
of the complaint. Our data confirmed expectations that in the ma-
jority of cases the patient's relationship with the licensee had termi-
nated at the time the complaint was made. Of the 165 (82.5%)
25. Fifty-two of the complaints (26%) contained allegations concerning non-licensees
such as office staff, nurses, pharmacists or the hospital or nursing home as a whole, in addi-
tion to or instead of allegations directed at licensees.
26. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 54 (1987).
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TABLE 5
Frequency of complained of behavior. (See note 1)
Complained of Behavior Frequency Percent
Office and appointments (e.g. waiting times, 9 4.5
cancellations).
Subminimal or incompetent (e.g. failure to 120 60
diagnose or treat, improper diagnosis,
treatment, or medication).
Professional/patient relationship problems 87 43.5
(e.g. sexual misconduct, records access,
failure to obtain informed consent).
Behavior and attitude problems (e.g. 58 29
rudeness).
Problems with billing. 46 23
Licensee impairment 4 2
Improper use of controlled substances. 11 5.5
Employment evaluation (e.g. disability, sick 5 2.5
leave).
Other consultation. 3 1.5
Other grounds for discipline. 13 6.5
Note 1: Complaints of behavior exceeds 200 cases because complaints
may raise more than one problem.
cases where the situation was clear from the file, 83 (50.3% of the
165) involved one-time encounters and a further 66 (40%) involved
cases where the physician/patient relationship had been terminated.
In only 16 (9.7%) cases was the relationship clearly ongoing. The
prevalence of complaints involving single episodes of care also illus-
trates the greater risk of a complaint faced by professionals who
treat patients with whom they do not have a long-term relationship.
B. Setting Of Complaintworthy Event Or Circumstance
Patients are much more likely to see physicians in their offices
than to receive care in hospitals. The average American patient had
three office visits in 1990, but only about one in ten were hospital-
ized.27 Correspondingly, a high proportion of complaints, 107
27. DHHS, HEALTH UNITED STATES, supra note 22, at Tables 76 & 84. Since a single
hospitalization usually involves multiple physician contacts, the relationship between these
statistics is not straightforward, though they indicate that patients see physicians more often
in physician's offices than in the hospital.
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(54%), concerned physicians' office-based care. Just over a quarter
of complaints, 55, involved hospital care. The most frequent loca-
tion of unsatisfactory hospital care was the operating theater (19),
followed by the ward (15) and emergency department (13). The
remaining complaints were based on care received in such places as
nursing homes, urgicenters, mental hospitals, and prisons. The pre-
ponderance of complaints involving office-based care underscores
the importance of the medical board's role in overseeing the quality
of medical care in an office setting, as most other quality assurance
mechanisms - Medicare Peer Review Organizations, Joint Commis-
sion accreditation and hospital risk management and quality assur-
ance programs only evaluate institution-based care.
VII. WHY DO COMPLAINANTS SAY THAT THEY
COMPLAIN?
We were also interested in trying to understand the motivations
of those who complained. In our attempts to gauge why certain
patients and relatives decide to make a complaint, our analysis was
necessarily limited to explanations of complaining behavior con-
tained in complaints to the Board. Many of the complainants did
not explicitly state in their complaint why they were complaining.
Where a reason was given, one of the most common was expression
of a desire to protect others from suffering the same fate in the fu-
ture. In the words of one complainant: "This is not just for my
mother but for some little old lady that has no family or no one in
the medical field that can recognize gross professional behavior that
may fall victim [to this doctor]" and again, "I would hate for any-
one to be extremely ill and have her do the same thing to them that
she has done to me."
Most often the letter of complaint gave no reason for com-
plaining beyond simply stating, "I am writing to complain about
One factor that distinguished the study proceeding in England
from that conducted in Ohio was the fact that the English study
examined complaints in the context of a public health care system
where patients are not charged for the treatment they received
while the Ohio study involved a system where the patient was re-
sponsible for the cost of treatment. The researchers on both
projects were interested to know whether in the American system a
complaint was likely to be precipitated by receipt of a bill. Our data
illustrate the importance of the issue. It can be seen from Table 5
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above that 46 (23%) of the complaints contained allegations of bill-
ing problems. Further, 27 (13.5%) of complainants stated that the
complaint was precipitated by receipt of a bill and in 20 cases bills
were actually attached to the complainant's letter.
VIII. WHAT DO COMPLAINANTS HOPE TO ACHIEVE?
Linked closely to the issue of the motivation of complaints is
that of what complainants hope to achieve by making complaints.
We were interested in knowing whether complainants articulate
specific goals in writing to the Board and, if so, what these goals
were. Understanding the objectives of complainants is key to un-
derstanding the match between expectations of those who complain
to the Board and the tasks it is able and willing to perform. It is
also a way of testing whether the objectives of those who complain
might be satisfied by means other than those currently employed by
the Board.
There are undoubtedly a number of objectives that complainants
hope to achieve, not all of which will be evident from their letter of
complaint. In some cases it is possible to assume that the complain-
ant wants something to be corrected despite the fact that this has
not been specifically mentioned. Where the complaint is, for in-
stance, about incorrect billing, it might be assumed that the com-
plainant wants the bill to be corrected. Significantly only 122, or
61%, of the consumer complainants stated explicitly in their com-
plaint what they specifically wanted or expected the Board to do.
These are shown in Table 6.
It is clear from this that the majority of complaints were not
obviously instrumental in the sense that they requested something
specific. Our findings reflect Lloyd-Bostock's suggestion that many
complaints can be seen as ends in themselves, the main purpose be-
ing to express dissatisfaction: "Some complainants do specifically
state that they want an apology, an explanation, compensation or
their appointment sorted out. Others may wish primarily for their
complaint to be acknowledged and taken seriously."2
The most common request was for the Board to "investigate"
the complaint. Other common requests included that the Board of-
fer "help"; protect the public from bad doctors; do "something"; or
provide an answer or explanation. Typical comments included,
28. Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions and Apologies in Letters of Complaint to Hospitals
and Letters of Response, in ATrRIBUTIONS, AccouNTS AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 217
(J.H. Harvey et al. ed., 1992).
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TABLE 6
(Complaints may contain more than one stated goal)
Number of Percentage
What the Complainant Said They Wanted Cases of Sample
An investigation 40 20%
"Help" 17 8.5%
Protect the public or preventing
recurrence 16 8%
To get Records 15 7.5%
Fee waived or reduced 14 7%
"Something done" 10 5%
To get an answer 8 4%
To get an explanation -8 4%
Licensee reprimanded 5 2.5%
Compensation 3 1.5%
License revoked or suspended 3 1.5%
Apology 2 1%
Teach licensee a lesson 2 1%
Other miscellaneous 22 11%
"Look into this situation and do whatever you deem necessary to
see that this situation does not recur"; "I wish in the name of God
that someone could help me with this problem.. .Please answer this
letter and tell me what could be done"; "We would be grateful for
any help the Board could give us in this matter." Often it also ap-
peared that the complainant lacked a clear notion of the powers the
Board had at its disposal to discipline physicians. Thus, only 3
(2%) of the complainants asked that the physician's license be re-
voked or suspended.
These findings have implications for the debate on the malprac-
tice "crisis," which tends to emphasize the potential for complaints
to evolve into claims, to see complaints as the first stage of a process
that may end in a claim.29 But, do public complaints to the Board
express grievances that could form the basis of a legal claim against
the doctor?
IX. THE COMPLAINING AND CLAIMING
POPULATIONS
The disciplinary functions of the State Board are associated with
29. See, ag., JOHN CARRIER & IAN KENDALL, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE: COMPLAINTS
AND COMPENSATION IN THE SERIES OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION 1-2
(1990).
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malpractice concerns insofar as the Board provides mechanisms
parallel to the litigation system for expressing grievances on the one
hand, and for the identification of and sanctioning of errant physi-
cians on the other. But is there any evidence that complainants to
the Board are also potential litigants or do the two channels service
essentially different populations? One of the difficulties in determin-
ing the potential overlap between the two populations is that com-
plainants do not always provide as specific information concerning
alleged fault, causation, and damages suffered as litigants are com-
pelled to provide when initiating legal proceedings. Nonetheless,
we were able to glean from the complaint investigation files useful
information for delineating the relationship between complaints and
claims.
We looked for two indications of a relationship between com-
plaints and legal claims. First, we looked for suggestions in the let-
ter of complaint that the allegations could also form the basis of a
medical negligence claim. Here we focused on whether allegations
in the complaint related to clinical care, whether the complainant
alleged that the complained of conduct had caused harm sufficiently
serious to ground a malpractice claim, and whether the complain-
ant was seeking compensation. Second, we looked for indications as
to whether the complainant had independently filed a malpractice
claim.
A. Allegations Made
It can be seen from Table 5 that the majority of complaints con-
tained allegations of mismanaged care. These included charges of
refusal or failure to test, misdiagnosis or delay in diagnosis, failure
to treat or improper choice or performance of treatment, and failure
to medicate or prescription of improper medication. All of these
allegations could have grounded a claim for medical malpractice if
they resulted in injury. In addition, complaints of sexual miscon-
duct, abandonment, or failure to obtain informed consent, which
were classified in the patient-provider relationship category, could
also have grounded lawsuits. Thus a substantial majority of the
complainants made allegations that could have also been expressed
in tort litigation, if sufficient severity and injury were present.
B. Injuries Suffered
The complaints examined frequently alleged that significant in-
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juries were caused by licensees.3" Evidence of physical harm is one
of the most important indicators of a potential malpractice claim.
In 116 (58%) of the cases examined, complainants alleged that they
had suffered harm caused by the actions complained of. This in-
cluded 9 allegations of pain from the procedure at issue, 39 allega-
tions of physical harm other than just pain (e.g., addiction caused
by improper prescribing, deterioration in condition caused by delay
in diagnosis or treatment, blindness caused by improper surgery),
32 complaints of mental or emotional harm, and 11 charges of
death caused by mismanaged care. In a further 32 cases (16%) the
complainant alleged that the allegation resulted in mental or emo-
tional harm to the patient. Forty-two complaints alleged other
losses that might also have been compensable, such as the denial of
worker's compensation, loss of employment, or financial loss attrib-
utable to the complained-of conduct.
C. Taking Further Action
It would seem then that there are indications from the data that
a number of cases might also have formed the basis of a legal claim.
Despite this, just three complainants mentioned the issue of com-
pensation in their letter of complaint. Moreover, only one com-
plainant mentioned having also filed a lawsuit prior to the time of
filing the complaint. In spite of the fact that 16 complainants men-
tioned contacting an attorney prior to filing the complaint, and that
11 threatened a lawsuit, it could only be determined from the files
examined that 1 complainant actually fied a lawsuit against the li-
censee subsequent to complaining to the Board.
The most reliable method of determining whether an overlap
exists between claimants and complainants would be to search the
indices of each of the courts in each of the counties of the state for
the names of each complainant. This task was beyond the scope of
this study. Nevertheless, because Medical Board investigators in-
terviewed the licensee concerning the incident at issue in most cases,
interviewed the complainant or patient in many cases, and often in
fact reviewed relevant malpractice indices to determine if the licen-
see had been sued on other occasions, it seems likely that any addi-
tional lawsuits fied against licensees by complainants would have
come to light.
Nonetheless, to confirm the lack of significant overlap between
30. Data is only presented where a direct causal link is made by the complainant be-
tween the allegation and the harm caused.
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claims and complaints we also examined malpractice settlements
and judgments reported to the Board under state and federal
mandatory reporting requirements to determine how many involved
conduct that had resulted in separate public complaints to the
Board. Twenty six (13%) of the 200 complaints in our non-public
report and referral sample were generated by malpractice reports.
In none of these had the plaintiff independently complained to the
Board about the incident that generated the suit. Moreover, a re-
view of an additional randomly selected sample of 100 of the 472
lawsuit settlements and judgments reported to the Board under
state and federal reporting requirements in 1990 also failed to reveal
a single instance where the plaintiff had independently complained
to the Board.
X. RESPONSE OF THE BOARD TO THE COMPLAINTS
The second major focus of our study involved an examination of
how the Medical Board responded to complaints. Very little is
known about the handling of complaints by boards other than
figures on the number of public disciplinary actions that boards im-
pose in response to unprofessional or incompetent behavior that
complaints reveal. To put these figures in context, however, we
need to know much more about the procedures for receiving and
investigating complaints, the standards used to judge what is ac-
ceptable and unacceptable behavior, and the constraints boards face
on taking formal action.
In our study we examined procedures used for receiving and
investigating complaints, the reasons why certain complaints were
filtered out, and the actions taken as a result of complaints. Because
our data were based on analysis of files we were unable to explore in
detail the ways in which the various investigators and members of
the State Board made their decisions about how a complaint was to
be handled. Future research could usefully pursue this further.
A. The Procedure - Receipt And Investigation
Once complaints are received at the Board they are logged in,
given a complaint number *and attached to a "complaint routing
form." The form is then sent to the Secretary, who is a physician,
and the Supervising Member of the Board, who is a member but
usually not a medical doctor. Non-public reports and referrals are,
with few exceptions31 handled in the same way. Diagram 1 shows
31. Malpractice Reports are cumulated and presented to the Secretary and Supervising
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Diagram 1
Ir l I °,IvRatonr or Re v ll
Secretary and Supervising Membe r
plaints g on to beinegtd In gor Stafe f Rempliew fo
Secretary and Supervisor Member
loa tgation Letter of c ain t lonsent Age ment
how complaints were processed by the Board.
Upon receipt of a complaint the Secretary and Supervising
Member make a joint decision as to how the complaint should b e
handled. The vast majority of cases generated from public com-
plaints go on to be investigated. In our sample of complaints from
the public, 184 (92%) cases were referred by the Secretary and Su-
pervising Member for review by Board staff or for investigation by
Board investigators. Most of the complaints that we closed without
investigation or review were complaints over which the Board
member once or twice a year by way of computer generated one page reports including re-
ported malpractice judgments and settlements and other information about the licensee. Af-
ter reviewing these the Secretary and Supervising member decide which to open as
"complaints" Auditor reports covering Medicaid fraud and overcharges are reviewed by the
Executive Director who makes a recommendation to the Secretary and Supervising Member
as to which to pursue further.
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lacked jurisdiction, usually because the complaint did not involve a
licensee or was concerned solely with the amount of a fee. Only
three (1.5%) of the complaints were closed because the complaints
raised problems not worthy of investigation. For example, one con-
cerned conduct that had happened over a decade previously, an-
other conduct that had already been investigated.
The remainder of complaints were referred to Board investiga-
tors for review or investigation. Four (2.2%) of these cases were
referred directly to Board staff attorneys for internal appraisal.
Cases sent for review typically involved complex and important al-
legations (involving, for example, an alleged Medicaid fraud scheme
or sexual misconduct) where further guidance was necessary before
the case could be assigned for investigation.
In the vast majority of cases, complaints were referred directly
to investigators. Occasionally the referral was accompanied by spe-
cific instructions about how the complaint was to be handled.
Where the complaint raised very serious allegations which needed
to be checked immediately it was marked "ASAP." There were 12
complaints that qualified for this treatment, including 5 where the
licensee was accused of sexual misconduct with a patient, 2 where
the licensee was alleged to be mentally impaired, and two where the
licensee was alleged to be maintaining the addiction of a patient.
The most common instruction was "check with doctor," which oc-
curred in 58 (29%) of the cases. This instruction indicated the
opinion of the Secretary and Supervising Member that the com-
plaint warranted an explanatory response from the doctor, but
would probably not require further investigation if this response
was satisfactory to the Secretary and Supervising Member. An alle-
gation that a physician had refused to issue a prescription for a mi-
nor viral infection in a child might warrant such a response. In
these cases the investigator normally reviewed the complaint and
perhaps the medical record with the practitioner being criticized.
All but one of these cases was closed upon receipt of the initial in-
vestigatory report. In a further 10 (5%) of cases the form was an-
notated, "get record," in most cases indicating that the investigator
should secure records for a patient whose records were wrongfully
being withheld.
Where specific instructions were not given, the investigator had
the discretion to conduct an inquiry as he or she saw fit within the
scope of the specific protocols provided by the Board for guidance
in investigating particular categories of cases. While these protocols
are confidential investigatory materials, they can be generally de-
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scribed. Allegations of incompetent provision of care, for example,
are generally investigated by interviewing the patient or complain-
ant, discussing the case with the treating physician, checking the
reputation of the physician in the medical community, checking the
local courts for malpractice filings, checking with Medicare Peer
Review Organizations for quality interventions and perhaps ob-
taining relevant medical records. Allegations of improper prescrib-
ing might involve checking with local pharmacists or perhaps
obtaining records of all controlled substance prescribed by the doc-
tor in local pharmacies or purchasing and dispensing records.
Complaints about rudeness might involve interviewing the patient,
the doctor, or office staff. Where physicians were visited by the in-
vestigator, this was often done without prior warning.
Complaint investigations demand the dedication of substantial
resources by the board. Investigators personally interviewed licen-
sees who were the subject of the complaint in 164 (89.1%) of the
184 cases investigated or reviewed by the Board. In 80 (43.4%) of
the investigated cases the investigator interviewed the complainant,
patient or both. Moreover, although 50 (25% of the total of 200)
cases took less than 3 months to close (including cases that were not
investigated), 80 (40%) took up to 6 months, 42 (21%) up to a year
and 28 (14%) over a year. Investigators spent between 2 and 96
hours conducting the initial investigation of complaints, with the
average time per investigation being just over 10 hours.
At the close of the investigation the investigator submitted a re-
port to the Secretary and Supervising Member. Their documents
varied considerably in length ranging from less than a page to over
ten pages in length. The Reviewers examined the report and de-
cided whether to close the complaint or to assign the case for fur-
ther action. The report occasionally included a recommendation as
to disposition from the investigator, particularly where the issue
was one that does not involve medical judgment. In a case, for ex-
ample, in which a patient complained that a doctor had been rude,
but the investigator upon interviewing both the complainant and
the doctor found the doctor mild-mannered and easy-going and the
patient loud and obnoxious, the investigator might have, based on
these impressions, recommended that the case be closed without
further action. Further review by the Board resulted in 19 referrals
back to investigators, 12 referrals for internal board review for rec-
ommendations on action to be taken, 5 referrals to staff with a view
to official citation, and 11 other referrals for miscellaneous further
actions, such as summoning the licensee for an office conference.
HEALTH MATRIX
Three quarters of the cases investigated or reviewed, 138, were
closed after review of the initial investigative report.
B. Action Taken After Investigation
The legislation establishing and empowering the Board gives it
broad authority to discipline its licensees for a wide variety of of-
fenses, including "The violation of any provision of a code of ethics
of a national professional organization...-32 or "A departure from,
or the failure to conform to minimal standards of care of similar
practitioners under the same or similar circumstances, whether or
not actual injury to a patient is established. '33 It also authorizes
the Board to impose various disciplinary sanctions, ranging from
revocation to reprimand. 4 Formal disciplinary processes must be
initiated, however, by citation. Once a medical board decides to cite
a physician, the process becomes public. Regardless of whether the
physician's license is ultimately taken or restricted, therefore, cita-
tion puts the reputation of the physician in jeopardy. Citations are
normally contested vigorously, and the Board bears the burden of
proof. The decision to cite, therefore, is a serious step and an indi-
cation that the offenses of a particular physician are sufficiently
grave to warrant the commitment of substantial public resources.
Only 5 (2.5%) complaints in the sample of 200 public com-
plaints resulted in formal disciplinary action by citation. These 5
citations, together with 2 additional consent orders whereby the
doctors agreed to disciplinary action by consent in lieu of proceed-
ing through a contested hearing, were the only actions in our sam-
ple stemming from the public complaints that would show up in
reported disciplinary statistics of the Board. They are thus the out-
put statistics on which the Board would normally be judged. Our
research has revealed however, that these actions only account for a
fraction of Board interventions. Total formal and informal Board
interventions are represented in Table 7.
It can be seen from the table that of the 193 total complaints
closed without formal action being taken, 10 resulted in "informal"
letters of caution being sent to the physician expressing the Board's
disapproval of the physician's behavior. Moreover, of the 138 com-
plaints closed after the investigator's report, 38 (19%) resulted in
other informal actions. In 7 cases the patient's bill was written off
32. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(18) (Baldwin 1992).
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(6) (Baldwin 1992).
34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B) (Baldwin 1992).
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TABLE 7
Table to show action taken by the Ohio Board as a result of public
complaints
Formal Action Taken Frequency
Citations 5
Consent agreement 2
Total formal actions 7
Informal Action Taken
Letter of caution following initial investigation 10
Investigator's warning 6
Records obtained for complainant 7
Bill reduced 7
Informal agreement to alter practice 8
Total informal actions 38
Total number offormal and informal actions taken 47
or reduced35 and in 7 more the patient was able to obtain previously
withheld records because of Board intervention. In 8 cases the in-
vestigator's report noted that the licensee agreed to a change in his
or her practice, usually related to non-clinical matters such as ap-
pointments or rudeness of staff. In 6 cases the investigator infor-
mally warned the licensee that continuation of complained- of
practices might result in further complaints and possible discipli-
nary action. When allowance is made for cases in which more than
one type of action was taken, there were 32 instances in which in-
formal action was taken. Together with the 7 formal actions this
represents much greater activity by the Board than has previously
been realized.36
35. Though the Board has no jurisdiction over the amount that a licensee bills a patient,
the Board does investigate cases where fraudulent billing is alleged such as cases where it is
alleged that the licensee billed for services that in fact were never rendered. Bills also are
written off or reduced in cases where the amount of the bill is not at issue, but the complain-
ant believes that the service for which the licensee billed was unsatisfactory, and thus that
billing for the service is inappropriate.
36. By way of contrast we also looked at how the 200 non-public referrals were handled.
Less of them were investigated, 153 as compared with 184 public complaints, but they were
more likely to result in formal disciplinary action and much less likely to result in informal
action. Overall, disciplinary activity was markedly higher than was true with public com-
plaints. The Board initiated disciplinary action in 24 (12%) of the 200 cases and entered into
consent agreements in 16 (8%). In addition, informal action was taken in 18 cases. This
included 8 letters of caution and 10 investigator's warnings. Since referrals and reports are
frequently based on prior actions taken by the referring institution or agency, and since the
Board is permitted by statute to take disciplinary action based solely on the prior action of
specified entities (such as other state agencies or the federal Department of Health and
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Despite a general belief that medical licensure boards should
play a major role in assuring the clinical competence of physicians,
it is clear from our data that most disciplinary actions do not focus
directly on issues of clinical competence. In the 400 cases reviewed
in this study, the Board took 29 formal disciplinary actions involv-
ing contested proceedings, entered into 18 consent agreements, and
issued 18 letters of caution, a total of 65 formal and informal disci-
plinary interventions initiated by the Board.37 Only 6 of these 65
actions were directly based on allegations of improper clinical prac-
tice not involving improper prescribing of controlled substances.
By contrast, 11 were based in whole or in part on physical or mental
impairment of the practitioner (usually substance abuse), 8 on viola-
tion of continuing medical education requirements, 7 on unlicensed
practice or engaging in activity beyond the scope of practice, and 7
on convictions for criminal conduct. None of these grounds neces-
sarily involved clinical incompetence. A number of other discipli-
nary actions were based on allegations that might have been related
to clinical competence: 7 were based on disciplinary actions of
other states, which may have included competency-based actions,
and 15 (the largest number in any category) were based on misuse
of controlled substances, which might involve competency but
could alternatively involve simple drug pushing.
Disciplinary actions based on allegations of clinical incompe-
tence generally require identifying and proving improper clinical
practice in multiple instances. Effectively, they require work
equivalent to investigating and then proving up several malpractice
cases simultaneously. They require testimony from at least one and
often several experts. Incompetence-based disciplinary actions are
thus very expensive and time-consuming endeavors. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that boards do not discipline a doctor for clinical
incompetence if they can alternatively discipline the doctor by
bootstrapping on the action of another medical board or on a crimi-
nal conviction, or if they can establish a more easily proved con-
trolled substance or CME violation. Nonetheless, the results of this
study give pause to those who believe that medical licensure boards
can play a major role in assuring clinical competence.
It is also clear from our research that where consumers raised
Human services), it is not surprising that non-public referrals and reports result in a higher
level of disciplinary activity than public complaints.
37. This does not include informal interventions taken by investigators, such as ob-
taining improperly withheld medical records or securing informal agreements to change prac-
tice arrangements.
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issues of physician competence, their complaints were seldom veri-
fied by Board investigation. One hundred and twenty (60%) of the
public complaints included allegations of violation of minimal stan-
dards of care. In only two cases alleging violation of minimum
standards and not involving allegations of misprescribing of con-
trolled substances was a doctor cited, brought under agreement or
sent a letter of caution.
XII. RESPONDING TO THE COMPLAINANT
Our study further calls into question the Board's responsiveness
to the public who make complaints. Of the 200 public complaints
studied, only 7 complainants received individualized letters from
the Board responding to the specific allegations made in their com-
plaint. A further 141 (70.5%) were sent a standard form letter
drafted by the Board at the close of the case.38 A staggering 26%
(52) got no reply at all.39
There was no way for us to discover from the data on fie how
satisfied the complainants were with the way the Board handled
their complaints. Only 7 complainants wrote a letter to the Board
after their complaint was closed. They asked for more information
than that which was provided initially; 3 repeated the information
they had provided in their first communication; and 2 expressed an-
ger at the letter received from the Board. Given the barriers which
most dissatisfied users have in complaining about services, we can-
not assume that this is the sum of dissatisfaction with the result.
What is clear is that the Board has not put a priority on responding
to complainants' particular concerns but rather uses the informa-
tion consumers generate to perform its policing role. This attitude
and lack of accountability to the very people who fund the Board
may be increasingly difficult to justify.4'
38. This letter stated:
Dear "Complainant,"
Thank you for informing the Medical Board of your concern regarding "Name of
Doctor"
Medical Board actions must be based upon violations of the State statutes which
regulate the practice of medicine and surgery. After careful review and considera-
tion, the Board's Secretary and Supervising Member have decided not to initiate
disciplinary action on the basis of this complaint.
We appreciate your bringing this matter to our attention for review.
39. One complainant received both a standard form letter and an individualized reply.
40. One of the earliest responses of the Board to a preliminary report on this study was
to develop a series of word-processed letters tailored to respond to various categories of com-
plaints to be used in lieu of the standard form letter.
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XIII. DISCUSSION
Our study attempted to discover more about who complains to
medical boards, how allegations of incompetence are investigated
and problem physicians identified by boards, and how boards react
once a problem has been recognized. In many senses the study
raises more issues than it is able to address and many of the ques-
tions it asks can best be seen as agenda for future research.
Our study of complainants indicates that family members play
an important role in the expression of grievances; that women are
much more likely to complain to the Board than men - both on
their own behalf and on behalf of other people - and that a signifi-
cant number of complainants use more than one formal channel to
express their grievance. In addition it illustrates that the vast ma-
jority of complaints about physicians concern allegations connected
with medical care, a significant number of which might form the
basis of a medical negligence action. Despite this, it is clear that
most complainants do not express an intention to sue, a desire for
compensation or, indeed, a clearly articulated demand that the li-
censee complained of be disciplined. Moreover, complaints are
most likely to be made about office-based physician care and only
once treatment has been completed.
Our data on the response of the particular board that we studied
illustrate that the majority of complaints were investigated. The
data emphasize the pivotal role of the investigator in the handling of
the complaints, in particular the power he or she exercises through
his or her discretion to uphold a particular version of competing
accounts of care received. It is clear that the investigator's exercise
of discretion may be crucial to the outcome of the case. It is clear
that the majority of complaints do not result in formal action being
taken, and that where such action is taken, professional incompe-
tence is not the primary focus of formal disciplinary actions. Most
significantly, we discovered that boards are much more active than
official statistics suggest.
What are the uses and implications of these findings? The pro-
fie of complainants might be of value in a variety of contexts. On
its own, it provides indications of who is most likely to complain
about physician care to a state board. This information might be of
interest to licensed professional risk managers, and those involved
in work involving patient satisfaction. In the context of under-
standing disputing behavior in health care, this study provides us
with data on one dimension of a multi-faceted issue. Complaining
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and claiming are increasingly being seen as atypical behavior, but
we have no way of knowing how atypical they are until voiced
grievances are compared with those that are not voiced through for-
mal channels. The profile presented here is a small advancement in
our understanding, which can be most fruitfully understood with
reference to profiles of the patient population generally, the non-
complaining but dissatisfied population, those who use different ave-
nues to complain, and those who sue. Moreover, it is possible that
not only is expression of grievance atypical behavior, but also that
issues complained of may be unrepresentative of the actual universe
of problems that result from medical care. It becomes clear then,
that complaints, let alone the disciplinary actions of state licensure
boards, may be nothing like the rational tools for evaluation of care
which we often attempt to make them.
The study also suggests the importance of adopting a more
global approach in the study of grievances involving medical care,
an approach that puts priority on examining the activity of the com-
plainant rather than the event or circumstances complained about.
Complaints to state licensure boards are just one channel available
to those dissatisfied with medical care. Our data show that a
number of complainants do not restrict themselves to complaining
through just one mechanism but rather complain to a number of
agencies simultaneously or sequentially.41 A complainant-based ap-
proach may provide us with a much more complex picture of com-
plaining behavior than would be suggested by an approach that
concentrates on one particular organizational perspective. In an era
in which emphasis is increasingly being placed on the importance of
concerted joint efforts between consumers, insurers, hospitals, phy-
sicians and regulators in the management of quality of care, this has
important implications, suggesting that there may be at this time
substantial duplication of effort among agencies.
Our data on the response of the Board to complaints also raises
questions as to the ability of medical licensure boards to address
problems concerning the clinical competence of their licensees (and
thus ultimately the problem of medical error) through disciplinary
interventions. It is often assumed that the primary function of li-
41. This may be because complainants approach a number of agencies simultaneously.
Alternatively, it may indicate that complainants work in a linear fashion, asking one entity to
resolve a problem, and then moving on to other entities looking for resolution/satisfaction if
the first attempt does not succeed. Thus multiple complaints may be not so indicative of
redundancy as they may be of inadequacy of discrete approaches. Our data, however, do not
allow us to discern which of these explanations most fully explains complaining behavior.
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censure boards is to assure clinical competence, and that the volume
of their formal disciplinary actions is an appropriate measure for
evaluating their success in accomplishing this task. Our study dem-
onstrates that evaluating board success solely on the basis of formal
disciplinary actions is inadequate because boards may be more ac-
tive at the informal level than is commonly supposed. Indeed, given
the resource constraints generally faced by licensure boards,42 and
the substantial commitment of resources required when formal ac-
tion is taken, it may be that informal action is not just an alternative
to formal disciplinary action, but a more rational strategy for
boards to pursue in some cases.
Moreover, to evaluate the effectiveness of the board as a tool for
addressing the problem of medical error by assuring clinical compe-
tency, we need to know much more both about the incidence of
medical error and about the relationship between competence and
medical error. The Harvard Medical Practice study has contrib-
uted much to our understanding of medical error and negligence,
confirming the finding of earlier studies that injury caused by medi-
cal error, and in particular by negligent medical error, is distress-
ingly common.43 Research into the relationship between medical
error and competence, or, more specifically, into the relationship
between the incidence of malpractice litigation and competence, is
less conclusive. While it appears that a relatively small number of
practitioners account for a relatively large share of malpractice
judgments, it is less clear that these practitioners are incompetent,
or that they can be readily identified prospectively.' At this point,
confidence that medical licensure boards are capable of systemati-
cally identifying incompetent practitioners, and that board interven-
tions can address the problems caused by such practitioners, are
probably misplaced.
42. Kinkel & Josef, supra note 11, at 211-12 (1991); OIG, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS,
supra note 2, at 7-8.
43. See supra notes 15 and 16.
44. A study of New Jersey malpractice claims concluded, for example, "... [W]e found
little evidence that negligence claims were sufficiently concentrated, either in number or in
kind, to permit negligence reduction strategies targeted at individuals. Our results... em-
phasize the difference between knowing that some practitioners must be more prone to incur
claims than others ... and being able to identify who they are." John E. Rolph et al.,
Malpractice Claims Data as a Quality Improvement Tool, I. Is Targeting Effective? 266
JAMA 2093, 2097-98 (1991). Another study of Florida claims concluded: "Empirical evi-
dence available up to now, including our study,... does not demonstrate that claims experi-
ence is a valid indicator of physician quality, although it does correlate with future claims."
Frank A. Sloan et al., Medical Malpractice Experience of Physicians, Predictable or Haphaz-
ard?, 262 JAMA 3291, 3297 (1989).
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It is particularly clear from our study that public complaints,
the form of information most commonly relied upon by boards for
identifying disciplinary infractions, rarely lead to formal discipli-
nary actions. It is understandable that reports and referrals from
other sources are more likely to result in disciplinary action, as they
generally consist of reports by persons professionally trained to rec-
ognize a problem or referrals from entities that have already con-
ducted their own investigation and concluded that a problem exists.
Nevertheless, the question remains why so few of the public com-
plaints in our study resulted in formal action being taken. It may be
that complainants are not very proficient at identifying problems.
Alternatively, it may be that the Board is not very adept at substan-
tiating problems identified by the public. Finally, it may be that
some complaints were in fact substantiated in part, but that it was
concluded that standing alone the problem identified did not war-
rant formal disciplinary action, and the commitment of resources it
would demand. Many of the 46 public complaint cases that were
not closed upon initial investigation fall into this category.
Whatever the case, the substantial resources committed by boards
to investigation of public complaints are difficult to justify if boards
are in fact primarily concerned with identifying incompetent practi-
tioners, since public complaints so rarely achieve this result.
One could argue in the alternative, however, that another reason
exists for medical licensure boards to be responsive to public com-
plaints, even if these complaints rarely identify disciplinary offenses
in general or incompetent physicians in particular. Though boards
do not exist as adjudicatory bodies to determine the justness of the
grievances that complainants bring to them, our study shows that
important decisions are in fact made in the course of investigations
as to the apparent rights and wrongs of a complaint. Our data fur-
ther show that this information has rarely been passed on to public
complainants in the past, raising the possibility that the grievance
complainants experience because of the lack of responsiveness of
physicians may be compounded by the lack of response they experi-
ence from the medical licensure board. Because boards are respon-
sible to the public, they are justified in investing considerable
resources in responding to public complaints. But this effort may be
largely wasted if boards fail in turn to communicate to public com-
plainants the message that their complaints are in fact taken
seriously.
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XIV. CONCLUSION
State medical licensure boards are widely, if dimly, perceived as
the keepers of the gate of the medical profession. When patients or
their advocates are aggrieved by physicians, they sometimes turn to
medical boards for help. Medical boards respond, though not al-
ways in ways that are perceived, or appreciated, or effective. Who
complains to boards, what they want, and how boards respond are
issues until now little understood. If boards are to carry out their
job effectively, more needs to be known about what that job is, and
about how best it should be carried on. This study is an initial con-
tribution to the understanding of these issues.
